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Abstract 
      This work presents a new Dual-Core LockStep approach to enhance fault tolerance in microprocessors. The 
proposed technique is based on the combination of software-based data checking and trace-based control-flow 
checking through an external hardware module. The hardware module is connected to the trace interface and is 
able to observe the execution of all the processors in the architecture. The proposed approach has been 
implemented for a dual core commercial processor. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed 
technique has a high error detection capability with up to 99.63% error coverage. 
1. Introduction
Microprocessors are the backbone of digital
electronic systems. The progress of manufacturing 
technologies and the reduction of the transistor 
feature size has made microprocessors cheap and 
suitable for a huge variety of applications. At the 
same time, the susceptibility to soft errors, mainly 
caused by ionizing particles, has grown to become a 
concern [1] in an increasing number of cases. For 
high reliability applications, microprocessors are 
required to be fault-tolerant, i.e., to be able to 
continue operation in the event of failure. In the past, 
fault-tolerant microprocessors were required for 
systems working in harsh environments, such as 
aerospace, but today they are increasingly demanded 
even at ground level.  
Techniques to protect microprocessors against 
soft errors can be classified into software and 
hardware techniques. Software techniques are very 
flexible, but they are inherently limited [2]. 
Hardware techniques that require modifying the 
microprocessor are often not feasible because the 
design and manufacturing of a microprocessor is a 
costly process that can only be afforded for high 
volume production. In contrast, Dual Modular 
Redundancy (DMR) is an attractive solution with 
high error detection capabilities. As microprocessors 
are today rather cheap, duplication is not expensive. 
In fact, multicore devices have become very 
common even for low-end devices, and state-of-the 
art MCU are starting to introduce safety features, 
which are becoming more relevant to automatic 
control, such as in the autonomous automotive 
industry and aerospace[3].  
Dual-Core Lockstep (DCLS) [4-7] is a DMR 
fault-tolerant technique that can exploit the 
availability of multicore devices. It consists in two 
processors simultaneously running the same set of 
operations, syncing their output each cycle and 
triggering a recovery routine in case of discrepancy. 
This architecture is described in the white paper ISO 
26262, where the DCLS processors are also referred 
as “ASIL-D MCUs”. Despite the safety features 
introduced, ASIL-D MCUs do not eliminate the need 
to implement other safety measures at software and 
system level. Several MCU’s and processors have 
successfully implemented this feature, for instance, 
Freescale MPC5643L [8], PPC405 Lockstep System 
on ML310 and the ARM Cortex-M33, Cortex-R4, 
Cortex-R5 and Cortex-R7 [3, 9]. The ARM Cortex-
R5, has been integrated in several platforms, such as 
TI Hercules TMS570 microcontrollers and in the 
Xilinx UltraScale MPSoCs. However, it has been 
reported that the recovery process presents high 
 
overheads, around x1000 compared to a Triple Core 
Lock-Step [9]. 
Software DLCS divides the processing into 
steps, ranging from individual instructions to a set of 
functions.  After each step, the results of the 
computations produced by each processor are 
compared. If they do not match, a rollback 
mechanism is triggered to restore the system back to 
a consistent state. The comparison of the 
computation results provided by the two processors 
is the key aspect of DCLS. Generally, only output 
data are checked for errors [5-6]. However, control-
flow errors may cause one of the processors to lose 
synchronization and eventually hang or get lost. 
Control-flow errors are not easy to detect as they 
may not have an immediate observable effect in the 
computed data. Moreover, it is common in dual cores 
that one of the processors acts as a master and the 
other as a slave. In such a case, the hang of the 
master can lead to the crash of the entire system. A 
possible solution to this problem is to use timeout 
watchdog monitors to detect unusually long 
computation times [6]. However, this approach is 
weak and results in a high error detection latency. 
Moreover, control-flow errors may produce latent 
effects that may remain in the system after it is 
restored even though the output data are correct.  
In this work we propose an enhanced DCLS 
approach that uses two complementary mechanisms: 
observation of information provided by the trace 
subsystem to monitor the execution control flow and 
a multithread software-based scheme to detect and 
recover from data inconsistencies.  
Most microprocessors today provide a trace 
subsystem for debugging purposes which is able to 
report the microprocessor control flow in a seamless 
and non-intrusive manner without affecting the 
execution. Under normal operation, the trace 
subsystem can be reused to monitor the control flow 
of the processor [10-11]. Errors that affect the 
control flow in any of the processors can be detected 
by on-line decoding the corresponding program 
traces and checking the obtained information [12]. 
Modern processor architectures and Operating 
Systems (OS) commonly support the parallel 
execution of different threads and processes. Those 
capabilities have been exploited in different 
approaches by executing several replicas of the code 
on the same processor (SMT-Simultaneous 
Multithread) [13], on separate cores (CMP-Chip 
Level Multiprocesor) [14] or using a mixture of them 
[15]. All those approaches rely on complex software 
stacks that include, in addition to the OS, different 
support libraries in order to reduce the development 
time and ease the management of the replicated 
threads/processes [16-18]. However, every software 
layer added introduces new vulnerabilities that 
degrade the overall reliability of the applications.  
In our approach, a CMP scheme has been 
adopted for bare metal applications (without OS) 
which renders a reduced number of race conditions 
and lower control overhead compared to traditional 
solutions. The redundant threads execute on different 
cores and, eventually, check their outputs. In case of 
discrepancies, threads are forced to re-execute the 
critical regions as recovery mechanism. The 
proposed approach can be considered a relaxed 
lockstep execution where protection may be applied 
with different granularity, from the whole 
application to just some critical regions of the code. 
Therefore, a suitable trade off can be established 
between the number checkpoints and the time 
overhead produced in case of recovery.  
 The proposed approach has been implemented 
and evaluated on a dual-core ARM Cortex-A9 [19]. 
The microprocessor is a hard core in a Zynq FPGA 
[20]. The proposed trace monitor has been 
implemented in the programmable logic. The 
proposed technique has been tested with an injection 
campaign of 871837 faults that resulted in 43769 
errors. Experimental results show that the proposed 
approach shows excellent error detection capabilities 
with a percentage of detected errors of up to 99.63%. 
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 
describes the proposed lockstep approach, section 3 
presents the experimental results and finally section 
4 summarize the conclusion of this work. 
 
 




Contrarily to other approaches that propose new 
hardware structures to extend the architecture of 
CMP processors, our solution is intended to be 
directly applied to modern multicore processors. The 
architecture uses redundant multithread support for 
data error detection combined with trace monitoring 




Fig. 1. Dual-Core LockStep Architecture 
 
Fig. 1 shows the architecture of the proposed 
DCLS approach. It is divided in three main blocks: 
multicore microprocessor (Multicore), ARM Trace 
subsystem (Coresight) and Control Flow Monitor. 
The Control-Flow Monitor is a small piece of 
hardware that can be embedded in a FPGA. Data 
error detection is implemented in the Multicore 
block and is described in subsection 2.2. The 
remaining blocks (Coresight and Control-flow 
monitor) are described in subsection 2.3. 
 
 
2.2. Data error detection 
 
A pure software mechanism has been developed 
for data error detecting and recovering. It is based on 
modular redundancy strategy and relies on the 
parallel execution of redundant threads on separate 
cores. This way it could be easily adapted to Dual or 
Triple Modular Redundancy depending on the 
number of available cores [21]. 
Similar to traditional threads supported by OS like 
Linux (POSIX Threads API) or specialized libraries 
(OpenMP API), in our model the two threads, named 
master thread (MTh) and shadow thread (STh) 
respectively, share instructions (see PM on Fig1) and 
data memories (see DM on Fig 1). However, as a key 
difference, each thread has its own stack (i.e. the 
memory region for storing temporary and automatic 
variables and function output variables) which 
allows to hold the replicas of the data. In addition, a 
third stack memory region is reserved to store the 
Context (Fig 1: Ctx). Since MTh is in charge of 
checking the Context and output variables of every 
region under consideration, this thread has access to 
the three stacks. 
The application is divided into several Critical 
Regions of code. Each one is characterized by the 
input or Context variables (i.e. global and local 
variables) and output variables. For the sake of 
completeness, in this work the Context contains all 
the information needed to define the status of the 
execution, i.e. the input variables to the region. As a 
limitation of the current implementation of our 
approach, we are not able to save the status of the 
processor’s cache, and therefore we assume it is 
disabled. As a side effect of this choice, the 
application should be written in such a way that 
input variables are not modified during the execution 
of the code within a region, so that in case of 
recovery, the integrity of those variables is 
preserved. 
Critical regions are delimited by annotation 
primitives in C or C++ and follow the concept of 
Sphere of Replication (SoR) established in [22]. To 
this end, the code section is instrumented to check 
the correctness of the variables and to synchronize 
the execution using barriers and mutex (mutual 
exclusion). The SoR defines the code regions where 
thread replication and parallel execution will take 
place. When the instruction flow reaches the SoR 
(critical region), a Context Check is performed by 
the MTh. If there are no discrepancies, the Context 
variables are saved to the Context Stack by the MTh. 
Every time the instruction flow goes out the SoR 
boundaries, consistency checks are automatically 
carried out by the MTh on the data stored on both 
stacks. A recovery procedure, i.e. the re-execution of 
the critical region, is executed if any discrepancy is 
found.   
Depending on the boundaries and the situation of 
the critical regions within the code, the protection 
can be applied at different levels of granularity to get 
the best trade-off between performance overhead and 
latency to recover from a fault.  
Figure 2 shows an example of annotated 
pseudocode for the Matrix Multiplication algorithm. 
As can be seen, SYNC and CHECK annotations 
enclose the inner-most loop and define a region. 
Also, this mechanism provides synchronization for 
each thread and automatic check over Context 
variables i,j and output variable acc respectively. 
The localization of the region defines a lockstep 
execution with NxN checkpoints (steps) and the 
recovery latency is equivalent to the execution time 
of the inner loop (lines 9-13) plus an additional 
assignment (line 9). A finer granularity could be 
obtained by including just the inner loop body in the 
critical region. As a result, the recovery latency 
decreases to just the execution of a line of code, at 
the cost of increasing the number of checkpoints up 
to NxNxN. Note that by removing the 8th and 12th 
lines (which are responsible for the automatic code 
instrumentation) we obtain the original unprotected 
code. It is remarkable that both SYNC and CHECK 
functions can be compiled along with the software 
application as they are written in C. Thus, to protect 
 
an application, the user is just required to manually 
introduce both functions enclosing the critical 
sections in the source code. In the future, a tool to 
insert automatically the calls for these functions is 
planned to be developed to enhance the scalability of 
this solution. 
 
Algorithm 1:  
1: NT= 2      //Number of threads 
2: A = Matrix[N][N] 
3: B = Matrix[N][N] 
4: C = Matrix[N][N] 
5: procedure MxM 
6:   for i = 0 to N-1 do 
7:     for j = 0 to N-1 do 
         //Start of region 
8:       SYNC(i,j;NT) 
9:       acc= 0 
10:      for k=0 to N-1 do 
11:        acc += A[i][k]· B[k][j] 
12:      CHECK(acc;NT) 
         //End of region 
13:      C[i][j]=acc 
 
Fig. 2. Redundant Threaded Matrix Multiplication 
 
In addition to the code annotation, other software 
tweaks were implemented to endow the dual core 
system with the ability of running redundant threads 
on bare metal. In first place, it was necessary to 
modify the Board Support Package (BSP) in order to 
initialize the platform and start up all cores presented 
in the architecture. It is common that, in bare metal 
environments, the BSP provides the minimal files to 
boot up the platform. However, BSPs only cover a 
little subset of the most common ways to boot a 
system. The default boot sequence is controlled by 
CPU0 while the other CPU gets into an infinite busy-
waiting loop. This default initialization code was 
changed to allow a boot in SPMD mode (Single 
Program Multiple Data). In second place, the 
memory map and the associated linker scripts were 
modified to support separate stack sections for each 
core. Finally, a spin-lock mechanism was added to 
allow the synchronization of the cores. 
2.3. Control-flow error detection 
 
The control flow of both cores is observed 
through an external hardware IP (Control-flow 
Monitor), which is connected to the trace interface. 
The proposed approach is a multicore extension of 
the technique presented in [12]. 
The dual-core ARM Cortex-A9 presented in the 
selected device contains a trace subsystem based in 
CoreSight modules [23]. Of the available CoreSight 
modules in the selected device, our system uses only 
the PTM (Program Trace Macrocell) [24]. PTM is a 
trace source CoreSight subtype. A PTM cell is 
associated to a single core of the architecture. Thus, 
for this work two PTM instances, PTM0 and PTM1, 
are used, which are linked respectively to core 0 and 
core 1 (Fig 1). Both trace sources are multiplexed 
and sent through the trace interface. The external IP 
decodes the trace information and checks the 
correctness of the execution-flow by controlling the 
PC addresses of the executed instructions in both 
cores.  
Two techniques are used to detect incorrect 
execution: confidence range checking and address 
watchdog checking. The former consists in 
configuring the external IP to treat some instruction-
memory address ranges as valid. While the 
instruction addresses of a core are within its own 
confidence ranges, no error is assumed. The latter is 
also related with the core instruction address, but in 
this case only one specific address is configured to 
be checked periodically, namely the first instruction 
of each step. It the required instruction address is not 
received within a configurable time, a timeout is 
asserted. In the case an unexpected instruction or 
timeout is detected in any of the two cores, an error 
signal is triggered. The IP works on-line with very 
small latency. No additional information is required 
or stored before execution takes place, and the 
required configuration register values can be 
determined at compilation time. The external IP can 
be configured from software as an AXI peripheral. 
To ease the use of the external IP, all user-
defined application functions have been targeted to a 
specific region of memory defined by the 
programmer in the linker script, so most of the code 
is inside the same confidence interval. Some native 
or library functions that cannot be targeted to this 
region have also been protected using three more 
confidence intervals. The first instruction of the main 
loop of the code has been selected as the instruction 
address to be checked by the watchdog. As the 
application is hardened with DCLS, the external IP 
has been configured to check both CPUs with the 
very same parameters. 
 
3. Experimental results 
 
A fault injection campaign has been performed 
to test the proposed technique. Faults were injected 
only in one of the two cores in the selected 
architecture. The Mth core have been selected for 
injection as it is the most critical considering that it 
 
performs context and data checking. 
Faults were injected in the register file adapting 
the technique presented in [12]. This technique 
generates bit-flips randomly in the register file. An 
external controller has been used in order to 
determine, classify and collect the observed and 
detected errors. In radiation environments, errors can 
also affect memories which are not covered by the 
utilized technique. Memories that are exposed to 
radiation are usually protected with redundancy 
techniques such as EDAC. In previous radiation 
campaigns [12], we have validated the fault injection 
approach with quite accurate error detection match 
between radiation and injection results even though 
we only injected faults in the register file.  
The control-flow monitor is located in the FPGA 
and radiation can affect its behaviour. Xilinx SEM IP 
[25] can be used to protect the FPGA and the circuit 
it contains. 
The experiments have been carried out on 
commercial ZYBO boards featuring a Xilinx Z7010 
Zynq [20] as the device under test (DUT). Both 
ARM Cortex-A9 cores in the DUT are clocked at 
650MHz frequency. At the beginning of the 
application, the external controller generates a 
random seed which is used to generate the injection 
parameters (time instant, register number and bit 
index) and the initialization values of program data. 
When the DUT has received the seed, the execution 
starts, and the injector as well. A fault is injected 
every five iterations of the application main loop. In 
the case no error appears in these five iterations, a 
silent error is assumed, and a new injection is 
produced. In the event of an error, the external 
controller registers the results and power cycles the 
DUT to start a new injection.  
The results of the fault injection campaign are 
summarized in Table 1. Two experiments were 
accomplished with two versions of a matrix 
multiplication benchmark: unoptimized (-O0: 
column 2 of Table 1) and optimized with maximum 
effort (-O3, column 3 of Table 1). Both benchmarks 
use matrices of 32x32 32-bit integer elements. 
For -O0 benchmark 591821 faults were injected 
resulting in 20011 (3.38%) errors. For -O3 
benchmark 280016 faults were injected resulting in 
23758 (8.48%) errors. 
The error categories reported in Table 1 are: 
•  Det. Hang: The fault has produced a functional 
interrupt in the system, which has been detected 
by the external IP. 
•  Hang: The fault has produced a functional 
interrupt in the system, which has not been 
detected. 
•  Det. Only IP: The external IP has reported a 
control-flow error while no functional interrupt 
has been produced. 
•  Det. Data: The fault has produced a data error 
which has been detected by the software. 
•  SDC: Silent Data Corruption, the fault has 
produced a data error which has not been 
detected. 
•  Comm: Communications malfunction between 
the DUT and the external controller that makes 
impossible to classify the error. 
•  Total: Total number of errors 
 
Table 1 




# errors % errors # errors % errors 
Det. Hang 15,462 77.27% 15,879 66.84% 
Hang 23 0.11% 64 0.27% 
Det. Only. 
IP 75 0.37% 135 0.57% 
Det. Data 4,338 21.68% 6,725 28.31% 
SDC 50 0.25% 940 3.96% 
Comm 63 0.31% 15 0.06% 
Total 20,011 100.00% 23,758 100.00% 
 
Table 1 shows the high error detection capability 
of the proposed approach, with 99.63% errors 
detected for the unoptimized version and 95.77% for 
the optimized one. For this metric we have not 
considered Comm errors, as it is not possible to 
categorize them. 
Regarding control-flow errors, it is noticeable 
that most of them are related with system functional 
interrupts, which are mainly caused by exceptions or 
loss of lockstep synchronization. However, few of 
them (Det. Only IP) have not produced this effect. 
These can be associated with control-flow errors that 
do not produce a hang on the system, for example, an 
error that causes a branch to a wrong, but valid, code 
region or an error in a loop index causing an 
unexpectedly bigger execution time. Although these 
errors can be false positives, it is highly 
recommendable to consider them as real errors for 
preventive reasons. Code optimization produces a 
small reduction on control-flow error detection rates.  
 With respect to data errors, there is a small 
portion of SDCs. These errors are caused by faults 
that are injected after the software check. Note that 
fault injection is non-stop, so data may be corrupted 
at any time and therefore an error may appear at the 
 
final check of the test used to categorize the results. 
Nevertheless, such errors could be detected if the 
final check is also made in lockstep. Anyhow, SDC 
errors represent a very small portion, particularly 
when executing unoptimized code. This effect 
increases when optimization is introduced because 
the compiler changes the order in which some 
operations are made to achieve higher throughput. 
Also, as the optimized code gets shorter, the 
probability to inject an error after the software check 
gets higher. It is remarkable that optimization has 
been introduced on the very same code that produced 
the unoptimized version, meaning that no further 
effort has been done to enhance error detection for 
the optimized version, so there is room for 
improvement. Even so, the data detection penalty is 
restrained and could be affordable for some 
applications. 
In relation to error rates, optimized code has 
higher susceptibility to errors: 8.48% of injected 
faults produced errors while in the unoptimized 
version only 3.38% of injected faults resulted in 
error. Furthermore, data has demonstrated to be more 
prone to errors in the optimized version as 32.27% of 
total errors were data errors contrasting with the 
21.93% of the unoptimized code. These two effects 
are related to a much higher use of registers in the 
case of the optimized version. Considering these 
results, it is interesting to go deeper on how registers 
are related to errors, extracting the injector 
information when the error occurs. Fig. 3 presents a 
comparison of the register sensitivity distribution in 
both code versions. 
 
  
Fig. 3. Register sensitivity to errors 
 
Results in Fig. 3 demonstrate the more extensive 
usage of registers in the case of optimized (-O3) 
code, as all core registers except r12 produce errors. 
In the case of unoptimized code, only four general 
purpose registers, r0 to r3, are used so faults injected 
on r4 to r10 have no impact on errors. Frame pointer 
(fp) and program counter (pc) are strongly related to 
the execution control-flow and have the highest error 




This work presents a Dual-Core Lockstep 
approach enhanced with redundant multithread 
support and control-flow error detection. Data error 
detection and recovering is based on the parallel 
execution of redundant threads on separate cores and 
a pure software technique that checks the correctness 
of the data and synchronizes the execution checks. 
Control-flow protection is accomplished by an 
external hardware IP that monitors the execution 
trace of the two cores in a non-intrusive way with 
small latency.  
Experimental results demonstrate that control-
flow errors are very likely, so that both data and 
control-flow checking are needed for effective error 
detection. The proposed approach achieves a high 
error detection rate (up to 99.63% error coverage) 
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